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— THE MYTH OF FORMALITY IN THE GLOBAL 
NORTH: Informality-as-Innovation in Dutch Governance
Rivke Jaffe and MaRtiJn kosteR
Abstract
Why has urban informality in the global North received so little attention? We 
suggest that this neglect can be explained in part by the tendency of scholarship to 
reproduce the myth of Northern formality: the widely held belief that informality occurs 
only in corrupt and clientelist ‘developing countries’. This myth has allowed activities 
and connections that would generally be framed as clientelist or corrupt in the global 
South to be rebranded as policy innovation in Western Europe and North America. In this 
brief paper, we challenge the myth of Northern formality by focusing on two empirical 
cases of informality in Dutch governance that demonstrate how the state frames the 
toleration and deliberate use of informality as policy innovations. Specifically, we focus 
on strategic, uncodified and non-transparent deviation from legal procedure in order to 
achieve compliance and/or effectiveness. Relying on ethnographic methods and secondary 
sources, we discuss firstly the governance of Amsterdam’s red light district and secondly 
participatory infrastructure projects in the surrounding province of North Holland. The 
first case highlights the strategic non-enforcement or non-application of laws, while 
the second case points to the use of personalized relationships and non-transparency in 
participatory governance.
Introduction
As the editors of this forum argue in their introduction, informality is ubiquitous 
in cities across the world. Until recently, however, the study of urban informality has 
tended to focus on cities in the global South. This neglect, we suggest, might be 
explained by the fact that many urban scholars working in Western Europe and North 
America have tended to reproduce the stories that their governments like to tell: that 
these countries and their cities are governed in a formal fashion––if informality was 
ever a prevalent mechanism of governance here, it is a thing of the past, which now only 
occurs in corrupt and clientelist ‘developing countries’. While these widely held beliefs 
contrast with the reliance of the same governments on various informal methods of 
governance, this myth has allowed activities and connections that would generally be 
framed as clientelist or corrupt in the global South to be rebranded as indications of 
policy innovation in the global North.
In this brief paper, we challenge this myth of Northern formality by focusing on 
two empirical cases of informality in Dutch governance that demonstrate how the state 
frames the toleration and use of informality as policy innovations. While in the global 
South such informal governance practices would be taken as evidence of corruption, 
collusion or a failure of the rule of law, in the Netherlands we see such practices framed 
as positive innovations that other countries would do well to emulate. Specifically, we 
focus on the strategic, uncodified and non-transparent deviation from legal procedure 
in order to achieve compliance and/or effectiveness.
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Relying on ethnographic methods and secondary sources, we discuss firstly 
the governance of Amsterdam’s red light district (RLD) and secondly participatory 
infrastructure projects in the surrounding province of North Holland. For the RLD, we 
focus on the longstanding Dutch ‘toleration policy’ (gedoogbeleid) that allows for state 
management and regulation of illegal activities such as drug use and prostitution, and 
on more recent policy efforts to ‘clean up’ the district, which again rely on informal and 
semi-legal mechanisms. In the province of North Holland we concentrate on informal 
practices in participatory projects related to infrastructure, and specifically on so-called 
kitchen table negotiations between residents and state representatives. The first case 
highlights the strategic non-enforcement or non-application of laws that continue to be 
applied elsewhere, including a reliance on legal instruments that give the authorities 
increased ‘room for manoeuvre’, while the second case points to the use of personalized 
relationships and non-transparency in procedures formally aimed at public, transparent 
forms of participatory governance.
Informal governance as ‘innovative’
Informality is often defined as that which is not regulated by the state. In 
addition, it is generally associated with low-income marginalized populations. However, 
as authors such as Ananya Roy (2009) and Colin McFarlane (2012) show based on their 
work in urban India, elites and government actors also draw strategically on unregulated 
modes of urban planning and development. Showing how informality is embedded in 
formal governance arrangements, Daniel Goldstein (2016: 7), in his research on urban 
Bolivia, uses the term ‘disregulation’ to describe situations where ‘the state administers 
its own preferred forms of regulation while ignoring others, privileging a system of 
discretionary surveillance and enforcement’.
Informal practices and arrangements are part and parcel of the workings of the state 
(Schoon and Altrock, 2014). This insight complicates the dichotomy between the formal 
and the informal, in which the formal is often used as a synonym for everything designed 
and controlled by the state, while the informal implies all that is ‘non-state’ (everything 
that takes place ‘in the shadows of’ the state or outside state control). Contrary to prevalent 
analyses, informal practices and arrangements do not only take place outside of officially 
sanctioned procedures. Rather, they may form an inseparable part of these procedures.
As the introduction to this forum sets out, analysing urban informality requires 
engaging with how states are imagined. As authors within political sociology and 
the anthropology of the state have argued, understanding how states work involves 
studying both everyday bureaucratic practices and the representations that allow ‘the 
state’ to appear as separate from society (Abrams, 1988; Gupta, 1995). As the editors of 
this forum point out, the dominant focus on informality in cities of the global South 
connects to both scholarly and on-the-ground imaginaries of the postcolonial state, 
which is generally understood as ‘less-than’ (European and American ideal types). These 
imaginaries of the state are often dystopian, with a lack of state regulation framed as 
dangerously chaotic, for instance in depictions of ungovernable ‘fragile’ cities (Muggah, 
2014). Only rarely is the informality associated with a ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ state presented 
in a more positive light, for instance in Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) idea of chaotic urban 
self-organization as the dynamic future of cities.
The lack of focus on informality in countries such as the Netherlands is driven by 
an unrealistic academic and vernacular imagination of the state. Many urban and regional 
studies of Europe and North America are based (either implicitly or explicitly) on the 
idea that governance is achieved primarily through formal practices, ties and networks. 
If informality––such as personalized and non-transparent transactions, together with 
unregulated economic activities––is not framed as a thing of the past, it is understood as a 
marginal presence associated with pockets of poverty or immigrant groups. The conflation 
of informality and marginality is strengthened by the skew in the literature on informality 
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in the global North towards low-income and immigrant populations, as indicated by the 
editors of this forum in their introduction. This assumption of formality has obscured the 
prevalence of discretionary state ‘disregulation’ and of the personalization of governance 
practices in Europe and North America (in contrast to the deregulation and privatization 
described in many studies of the neoliberal or enabling state).
In this paper, we seek to relocate concepts and approaches that were developed 
primarily in South Asia and Latin America to Western Europe. As our Dutch cases show, a 
broad range of governance domains have been disregulated, with state actors strategically 
tolerating and utilizing informality by enforcing legislation and regulation only partially. 
This mode of governance also emphasizes bureaucratic flexibility and discretion in 
everyday encounters and problem solving, and allows for explicitly personalist practices, 
ties and networks. However, this informality is rarely described as such and is hardly ever 
connected to similar processes in the global South. Rather, in post-welfare states such as the 
Netherlands, these informal governance practices have been pitched as policy ‘innovation’. 
Resembling Swyngedouw’s (2005) ‘governance-beyond-the-state’, these policies allow 
non-state actors (criminal organizations, corporations, citizens) to negotiate a larger role 
in domains where state actors are unwilling or unable to enforce stringent regulation. 
However, as our case of the RLD shows, successive Dutch governments were quick to frame 
informality as innovation well before their general turn to neoliberal policies in the 1990s.
Partial unrule of law
The red light district is one of Amsterdam’s most famous tourist attractions 
and is often seen as exemplary of Dutch policies on prostitution and drug use.1 These 
have long been understood locally and internationally through the idea of regulated 
‘toleration’ policy, or gedoogbeleid in Dutch.2 From the 1960s until around the turn 
of the century, much of such policy could be characterized as something in between 
legalization and criminalization. While prostitution was not fully legalized until the late 
1990s, it was national policy not to prosecute. The idea behind gedoogbeleid was largely 
pragmatic: it is more efficient and effective to contain and regulate certain formally 
illegal activities without applying criminal law. The head of the Amsterdam police in 
the mid-1970s was quoted as explaining that ‘If we were to act exactly according to the 
law, we would have to abolish the entire sex work industry and everything that comes 
with it … but we also have to adjust to developments in society’.3
In addition to generating various ‘grey’ mechanisms for managing illegal goods 
and services, this toleration policy has also relied on informal connections between 
police, policymakers and (suspected) criminals. In the 1970s and 1980s, sex industry 
entrepreneurs and pimps kept the district relatively safe in order to prevent police 
intervention and to ensure that clients would find their way to sex workers. In an oral 
history interview, a former police officer explained that sex industry leaders preferred 
not to call the police when their customers made trouble; instead, they would employ 
Hell’s Angels members to act as informal policing agents. With the proliferation of hard 
drugs (especially heroin) during these decades, the population of sex workers came to 
include more vulnerable groups of drug addicts and immigrants.
A parliamentary inquiry held in the mid-1990s showed that a select number of 
organized crime groups were involved not only in prostitution and drug trafficking, 
but also in human trafficking and money laundering. They ran the local economy, 
1 This paper draws on research conducted by Rivke Jaffe with the assistance of Marthe Singelenberg (University of 
Amsterdam), based on secondary sources, media analysis and oral history interviews with former and current 
residents, police officers, entrepreneurs and workers in the sex industry, and drug addicts.
2 This resembles a particular type of Schoon and Altrock’s (2014: 216) ‘conceded informality’ in present-day China, 
where the state tolerates selected informal practices.
3 H. Korver, ‘Ouders laten 8-jarig dochtertje naakt fotograferen: Activiteiten sex-koning Jan B. worden uitvoerig 
nagetrokken’ [‘Parents allow 8-year-old daughter to be photographed naked: thorough investigation of sex-king 
Jan B.’s activities’], De Telegraaf, 12 April 1975 (author translation).
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regulating labour in the prostitution sector as well as in cafés, real estate and security, 
operating what amounted to their own informal zoning laws and licensing system 
(Brants, 1998: 627–8). In interviews, both police and entrepreneurs confirmed the 
existence of an informal banking system, in which locals could access unregulated loans, 
albeit at a monthly interest rate of 25%. Arguably, the ‘pragmatic’ policy of selective 
non-enforcement amounted to a semi-strategic production of variegated sovereignty 
(cf. Ong, 2006), a de facto outsourcing of control of the district to the vice industry. This 
divestment of responsibility took place in a highly opaque fashion.
Starting in the 1990s, consensus began to form that gedoogbeleid had resulted 
in a number of excesses in the RLD, and that the area needed to be ‘cleaned up’. This 
culminated in the municipal government’s ‘Project 1012’, named after the RLD postal 
code, introduced in 2007 as a comprehensive plan aimed at crime reduction and 
economic upgrading. This plan involves a reformulation by the municipal government 
of the governance of the RLD, which relies on ‘innovative’ informal and semi-legal 
measures to concentrate sex work and drug-related activities in a shrinking area and 
promote state-led gentrification.
Within the framework of ‘Project 1012’, the municipality began to buy up 
and renovate properties that were used for prostitution and other ‘low-value’ or 
‘criminogenic’ functions, and to introduce property zoning to promote ‘valuable’ 
activities such as boutiques and chic coffee bars. In certain cases, property owners are 
expropriated; in other cases, financial subsidies are used to stimulate entrepreneurs 
to adapt their business according to this new zoning. In addition, ‘integrity screenings’ 
have been introduced that bar both convicted and merely suspected criminals from 
owning or operating ‘undesirable’ businesses. This strategy involves a highly flexible 
use of legality in its application of administrative law rather than criminal law. Unable 
to successfully prosecute major sex industry players, state actors draw on spatially 
delineated legislation to harass both suspected and convicted criminals, and to deny 
them permits to run legal but allegedly criminogenic businesses. At the same time, 
the property buy-outs have resulted in millions of euros of government money being 
transferred to alleged criminals.
While not uncontroversial, such measures are rarely framed as ‘corrupt’ or 
‘undermining the rule of law’––framings that, in the global South, would be applied to 
comparable cases of public-to-private money flows or the state harassment of antagonists. 
Rather, the municipal government defends these measures as necessarily creative 
solutions to an intractable governance problem. Where in discussions of ‘developing 
countries’, Dutch politicians or bureaucrats might refer to informal strategies in order 
to delegitimize foreign governance actors, here they make reference to such measures 
to legitimize their own authority. Like the earlier gedoogbeleid policies in the RLD, 
‘Project 1012’ is presented as a pragmatic and innovative approach, seeking to reconcile 
a commitment to social order and the rule of law with the reality of crimes and criminals 
that are hard to prosecute. Both approaches to the RLD entail semi-official zoning 
arrangements that involve the production of variegated sovereignty in order to facilitate 
contradictory state objectives––a modality of informal rule comparable to that described 
by Picker (2019, this forum) in his analysis of NGO rule in Romani camps in Montreuil.
Informal participatory governance
A very different case of informality in state practices is found in a number of 
participatory projects conducted by the province of North Holland, in which the city 
of Amsterdam is located.4 In contrast to municipal governments in the Netherlands, 
4 Between September 2014 and July 2015, Martijn Koster coordinated this research on participatory governance, for 
the Province of North Holland, carried out with Restlan Aykaç (Province of North Holland) and Olga Verschuren 
(Utrecht University).
THE MYTH OF FORMALITY IN THE GLOBAL NORTH 567
citizen participation is new to provincial government, the administrative level between 
national and municipal government. The research on which this case is based studied 
two participatory infrastructural projects: one aimed at the improvement of a provincial 
road, the other at dike reinforcement. Both projects followed a specific set of regulations 
aimed at guaranteeing citizen participation.
In the road improvement project, provincial bureaucrats organized multiple 
participatory meetings. In these meetings, the provincial government invited residents 
who lived along the road or in the villages that were connected by the road to discuss 
and vote on multiple scenarios. Since all of the scenarios necessitated additional land, 
the province had to expropriate property from several farmers and other landowners. 
In what they presented as tailor-made negotiations, the bureaucrats invited all owners 
to what the local area manager referred to as ‘kitchen table conversations’. One of the 
bureaucrats, responsible for contact with citizens, said: ‘It takes place simply at the farm, 
at the kitchen table ... Sometimes [the land] has a whole history. It belonged to their 
grandfather or it has been family property for hundreds of years. Sometimes there are all 
kinds of family feuds’. He explained that he had to solve these problems at the kitchen 
table and find a reasonable solution.
The bureaucrat in charge of the taskforce that monitors and promotes citizen 
participation in the provincial government explained that it was critical to hold kitchen 
table conversations prior to the start of the official participatory trajectory: ‘Before we 
start with the real citizen participation, we know who the stakeholders are ... We need 
to go and talk to these people’. Other bureaucrats explained that if landowners were 
to refuse the final offer for their land, they could be expropriated through a lengthy 
legal process, since road improvement, like dike reinforcement, could be framed as 
a ‘collective security issue’ in which the authorities had a final say. Such kitchen table 
conversations also took place in the dike reinforcement project, especially with the 
owners of dike houses. Here the issue was not so much expropriation, but the possible 
impact in terms of real estate value that might lead to costly lawsuits.
The idea of tailor-made negotiations, which included discussing the non-monetary 
meanings of land, granted bureaucrats greater discretionary power. It represented 
a strategy to move from a legal procedure of expropriation towards a personalized 
relationship. The bureaucrats involved saw the negotiations as a way to achieve effective 
outcomes, framing the quality of state–citizen relations in terms of legitimacy rather 
than legality. This personalization and the emphasis on intimate spaces of interaction 
were especially important, as distrust of government officials was known to generate 
resistance and result in lengthy and expensive court cases contesting expropriation. 
Landowners themselves acknowledged their appreciation of this approach.
The kitchen table negotiations were a widely employed practice, accepted by all 
parties involved. These household-level negotiations were included as a standard phase 
in the official trajectories of the participatory approach, taking place before and during 
collective participatory meetings with all residents. The general, formal procedure of 
citizen participation was open to the public, transparent and documented in detail. In 
contrast, these kitchen table conversations were held privately in domestic settings 
and were not documented anywhere. In so doing, they formed an opaque element in 
participatory procedures intended to open up governance to citizens. Although similar 
informal practices have often been labelled as ‘clientelist’ and ‘corrupt’ in studies on the 
lack of ‘good governance’ in the global South (see e.g. Khan and Swapan, 2013), in this 
context they were considered to be a contribution to novel forms of citizen participation.
Conclusion
This brief paper has focused on the uses of informality in Dutch governance, 
drawing on two cases that illustrate how informality is embedded in the official 
procedures and projects of the state. Both cases demonstrate how the authorities 
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strategically depart from legally transparent and codified procedures, adopting opaque 
and personalist mechanisms of governance in order to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of particular policies. In so doing, both cases show how formal governance 
arrangements are entangled with informal practices. Personal contacts between citizens, 
(illegal) entrepreneurs and government representatives play a decisive role in these 
governance processes. This analysis connects to work by Ananya Roy and others, who 
emphasize the strategic use of informal practices by states, but shows how in the 
Netherlands such practices are not seen as shady power moves or ‘less-than’ modes of 
governance. Rather, state agents claim and promote these practices––in all apparent 
sincerity––as laudable policy innovations, sometimes referring explicitly to a supposedly 
Dutch tradition of creative pragmatism. This successful, legitimizing definition of 
‘informality-as-innovation’ by institutional actors is key to understanding why popular 
and academic perceptions of Dutch governance rarely involve ‘informality-as-a-problem’.
The Netherlands is often seen––not least by its own citizens––as a highly 
organized and regulated society. We suggest that this pervasive, normative and often 
self-congratulatory ‘myth of formality’ has deflected the attention of informality re searchers 
away from recognizing the pivotal role that informal practices and arrangements play in 
such ‘formal’ contexts. Debunking this myth, and correcting this epistemological skew 
in studies of urban and regional governance, involves attending more closely to informal 
practices, even in seemingly highly formalized places. The rethinking of mainstream 
analyses of European and North American governance is facilitated by mobilizing and 
translating concepts developed in, for instance, South Asia and Latin America––rethinking 
the conceptual geographies of informality becomes easier when we challenge dominant 
geographies of theory.
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